Deciding on war and peace: the battle for British war powers in the post-Iraq era by Tharmarajah, Vigunthaan
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2020
Deciding on war and peace: the


















DECIDING ON WAR AND PEACE: 
 





















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
 
requirements for the degree of 
 








































© 2020 by 
 VIGUNTHAAN THARMARAJAH 









First Reader   
 David Mayers, Ph.D. 





Second Reader   
 Dino P. Christenson, Ph.D. 








I would like to dedicate this work to my Amma and Appa  




I’d like to thank my advisor, Professor David Mayers, who has been incredibly patient 
and helpful throughout the process of researching and writing this paper, and whose 
encouragement, insight, and feedback have helped nurture my interest in this important 
topic. I’m also grateful for the input and advice of Professors Dino Christenson and 




DECIDING ON WAR AND PEACE: 
THE BATTLE FOR BRITISH WAR POWERS IN THE POST-IRAQ ERA 
VIGUNTHAAN THARMARAJAH 
ABSTRACT 
 Tony Blair’s extraordinary decision to ask for Parliament’s approval for British 
military deployment in the Iraq War prompted lingering questions about who decides on 
matters of war and peace in modern Britain. His successors’ use, and thereby 
confirmation, of the new parliamentary prerogative suggested a fundamental 
reorganization of war powers in British politics, giving Parliament a significantly 
stronger position in the realm of foreign affairs. This paper argues that a number of 
factors, like a Prime Minister’s leadership style, the role Cabinet and the civil service, 
and Parliament’s governing disadvantages that makes it difficult for Members of 
Parliament to assert themselves proactively rather than reactively, make the prospect of a 
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As one of the most storied military powers in the history of the world, the United 
Kingdom always waged war from the top: the monarch. That was, until recently, when 
the battle for war powers became a repeatedly contested issue in British politics as 
Parliament sought to play a decisive role in matters of war and peace. So, as the power of 
the monarch wanes, and the debate continues over whether the premiership is becoming 
more presidential, it is Parliament that finds itself in the middle of it all, hoping to extend 
its jurisdiction into the foreign domain too. 
 Parliament has historically lacked formal war powers, in part because the British 
legal system exists “through an informal patchwork of written laws and unwritten 
conventions” rather than a formal constitution.1 Instead, it was the monarch, and later the 
Prime Minister, that decided when the nation went to war. Then, in 2003, Prime Minister 
Tony Blair put the decision to go to war in Iraq to a vote in the House of Commons. He 
was under no obligation to do so, since neither the law nor precedent required him to seek 
the a priori approval of MPs. Nevertheless, he made a gambit for legitimacy, amid 
protests from those in his own Cabinet and party.  
Despite a record intra-party rebellion and historic public protests, Blair won the 
vote handily, 412-149, in large part thanks to his parliamentary majority and popularity. 
In doing so, he set a remarkable precedent of Prime Ministers going to Parliament for 
 
1 James Strong, “Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing the Growth of the Parliamentary  
Prerogative through Syria, Libya and Iraq,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 17, 





approval on military deployments. Since then, MPs as well as successive Prime Ministers 
have vowed to codify these newfound parliamentary war powers. None have been 
successful and indeed, once Prime Ministers have assumed office, they have chosen not 
to diminish their decision-making abilities by legislating away powers to MPs.  
 Blair’s successors David Cameron and Theresa May have applied the convention 
irregularly, calling into question just how strong it is and what the future of war powers 
in Britain looks like. In 2011, Cameron asked for an after-the-fact approval from 
Parliament for Britain’s participation in trilateral strikes in Libya, which MPs approved. 
In 2013, having promised a parliamentary vote before any forthcoming military actions, 
Cameron asked for the approval of MPs to carry out strikes in Syria in response to a 
chemical weapons attack–he lost. Two years later, he won a Commons vote on carrying 
out attacks against ISIS in Syria. May however bypassed Parliament altogether in 2018 
when she joined the United States and France in airstrikes in response to another 
chemical weapons attack in Syria.  
 It was widely speculated that while Blair had set the precedent, Cameron had 
helped to crystalize it. Yet it’s clear that the parliamentary prerogative that emerged in 
the post-Iraq era is far from cemented, and that it in fact raises a great deal of uncertainty 
about who exactly decides on war and peace in Britain today. This paper does not seek to 
address the normative question of who should decide on such matters. Instead it seeks to 
examine the different levers of power within the British political system that play a role 
in the critical process of going to war, in whatever form it takes. Indeed, it is part of a 




influence in the post-Iraq era and the subsequent shift in British war powers. However, 
analyzing the many centers of decision-making and the political incentives at play, this 
paper argues that Parliament’s continued influence in war remains unclear and unlikely to 
be meaningfully codified.   
 Specifically, it begins by examining the leadership styles of premiers during war, 
and how it plays a significant role in both how they view and characterize the military 
intervention and also how they deal with Parliament in the process. This paper primarily 
considers Prime Ministers from Tony Blair onwards, but includes Margaret Thatcher and 
her handling of the Falklands War as an important historical reference point. Next, the 
paper contemplates the role of the Cabinet and the civil service, its evolution and 
different manifestations over the years, and its role (or lack thereof) in deciding on war. 
The final section considers the development of the parliamentary prerogative and its 
application in the post-Iraq years and what that means for the possibility of the creation 
of a “War Powers Act” that enshrines Parliament’s role in going to war. The paper 
concludes that the irregular application of the convention demonstrates the institutional 
advantages enjoyed by Prime Ministers, meaning MPs will likely continue to be subject 
to the whims of the government. Barring major constitutional reform that cedes executive 
powers to Parliament, made possible in no small part due to the political will from the 
Prime Minister, MPs will be forced to continue to utilize other channels of coercion and 




Background on War Powers 
 Before examining the ongoing battle for war powers in Britain, it is worth tracing 
how Britain went to war in the past, and for context, comparing it against the 
development of war powers in the U.S., one of its closest allies.  
   In the U.K., war powers have been historically tied to the royal prerogative, 
putting the sitting monarch in charge of matters of war and peace. The royal prerogative, 
which dates back to the 12th century, was a broad source of power for medieval monarchs 
and has since evolved to become more vested in the government, whose advice the 
monarch is constitutionally mandated to follow.2 Thought the powers of the Prime 
Minister largely came to be codified in statutes, the royal prerogative remained a 
significant source of power in world affairs, giving the executive authority to manage 
diplomatic partnerships, deploy troops, and sign treaties.  
 It is for this reason that Tony Blair’s decision to ask Parliament for an 
authorization prior to going to war in Iraq in 2003 was significant. It marked a turning 
point in the debate over British war powers, giving Parliament the ability to exercise 
powers it previously had never been able to. While the royal prerogative still exists today, 
albeit significantly diminished, the practice of consulting Parliament on military 
deployments has evolved into a convention within the past twenty years.  
Conventions are a common feature in the British political system, though the lack 
of written laws outlining powers and duties can cause uncertainty. This is in stark 
 
2 United Kingdom, House of Commons, The Royal Prerogative, (London: House of Commons 




contrast to the American system of governance, derived from the U.S. Constitution that 
enumerates powers between the three branches of government. 
 Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution outlines Congress’s powers to declare 
war and fund the military.3 The War Powers Resolution of 1973 sought to further expand 
Congress’s ability to restrain the President in terms of military engagements. The 
Resolution mandates the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing 
troops to military action, and forbids armed forces from being deployed for more than 60 
days, in addition to a 30-day withdrawal period, without a Congressional authorization 
for use of military force (AUMF) or a formal declaration of war by the United States.4 
Notably, President George W. Bush drastically expanded his war-making powers in the 
wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001 when he signed a proclamation 
declaring a national emergency. Proclamation 7463 gave the president sweeping powers 
to carry out whatever he or she deemed to be in the country’s national security interest. 
His successors, Barack Obama and Donald J. Trump, have renewed this instrument and 
have pursued military action and humanitarian interventions with it.5 Despite being a 
system with codified war powers, the U.S. is not unlike the U.K. today in its battle over 
war powers between the executive and the legislature.  
  
 
3 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8. 
4 “H.J.Res.542 - 93rd Congress (1973-1974): War Powers Resolution,” Congress.gov, November 7, 
1973, https://www.congress.gov/bill/93rd-congress/house-joint-resolution/542. 
5 Gregory Korte, “A Permanent Emergency: Trump Becomes Third President to Renew 






THE PRIME MINISTER 
 A leader’s style and conviction play a crucial role in his or her success. When and 
how they go about doing something matters as much, if not more, as what they do and 
why they choose to do it. Much of the existing scholarship on British war powers 
underscores the daring move by Blair to ask Parliament for permission to go to Iraq. This 
section examines how the leadership styles of Thatcher, Blair, Cameron and May have 
played an important role in determining who decides on when Britain goes to war. 
Though this paper, along with much of the broader British war powers literature, is 
focused on 21st century premiers, Margaret Thatcher’s approach to the Falkland’s War is 
helpful in this analysis, not least because many scholars consider it a turning point in her 
premiership. 
 When Argentinian forces invaded and captured the Falkland Islands in April 
1982, the British Government sent a naval task force and set up a war cabinet to oversee 
the operation that would go on to last 74 days, culminating in an Argentinian surrender. 
The British Government’s reaction, under the leadership of Thatcher, was swift and 
decisive, and came at a time when Thatcher’s premiership was flailing, struggling to cope 
with staggering unemployment and spending cuts in the aftermath of a recession.6 
Thatcher’s speech in the special Saturday sitting of the House of Commons to 
discuss the war was met with mixed reactions: “HMS ‘Invincible’ will be in the lead and 
will leave port on Monday. I stress that I cannot foretell what orders the task force will 
 
6 Lesley Kennedy, “How the Falklands War Cemented Margaret Thatcher's Reputation as the 'Iron 




receive as it proceeds. That will depend on the situation at the time. Meanwhile, we hope 
that our continuing diplomatic efforts, helped by our many friends, will meet with 
success.”7 Thatcher’s aggressive style and reputation aside, it is hard to imagine any 
Prime Minister conveying such a level of uncertainty regarding a military operation from 
the despatch box in the Parliament in the post-Iraq era without being heavily criticized by 
MPs even within his or her own party. Indeed, as evidenced in speeches by successive 
PMs since Blair, it is the executive’s responsibility to chart the course of the intervention 
and assure beyond reasonable doubt the safety and security of military forces.  
Some called Thatcher’s speech her worst ever, with the controversial MP Enoch 
Powell remarking, “The Prime Minister, shortly after she came into office, received a 
sobriquet as the ‘Iron Lady’...In the next week or two this House, the nation and the right 
hon. Lady herself will learn of what metal she is made.”8 Thatcher’s Foreign Minister 
Lord Carrington resigned under political pressure. Even so, as Domenico Maria Bruni 
notes, Thatcher herself was not politically hurt by the speech, mainly because she had 
made the Government’s intention to recapture the islands clear, but also because “the 
necessity of responding to a military attack imposed within the House the tacit agreement 
not to weaken too much who had to tackle the Argentine invasion.” 
Indeed, Thatcher was helped by the sentiment of those like Conservative MP Alan 
Clark who were humiliated by the invasion. “We’ve lost the Falklands […] It’s all over. 
 
7 Kennedy, “Margaret Thatcher's Reputation.” 
8 Domenico Maria Bruni, “A Leader at War: Margaret Thatcher and the Falklands Crisis of 1982,” 




We’re a Third World country, no good for anything,” Clark said.9 The sense of losing the 
last remnants of the British Empire rallied patriotic sentiment and public support even in 
turbulent economic times.  
 As many scholars have observed, her clear, decisive leadership during the war 
helped propel her back into popularity and ultimately to re-election the following year. 
MPs, her own advisers, and even Britain’s closest ally, the United States, were all 
reluctant about waging war, at least in the beginning, and advocated for diplomatic 
solutions. "When you are at war you cannot allow the difficulties to dominate your 
thinking: you have to set out with an iron will to overcome them… And anyway what 
was the alternative? That a common or garden dictator should rule over the queen's 
subjects and prevail by fraud and violence? Not while I was prime minister,” Thatcher 
reflected in her 1993 memoir.10 In leading the nation into and through the war with a 
clear mission, she not only became the first woman to do so in Britain since Elizabeth I 
but also became a player on the international stage as the first British female prime 
minister.   
By acting quickly and with conviction, Thatcher managed to turn around the 
fortunes of the British Government in the Falkland Islands as well as her own political 
fortunes. It may well be true that despite Thatcher’s declining popularity and continued 
economic anxieties, a response to an attack on a British island would inherently be more 
acceptable – if not inevitable – than a military intervention on the basis of a vague 
 
9 Kennedy, “Margaret Thatcher's Reputation.” 




security threat or humanitarian crises in foreign countries. Nonetheless, Thatcher’s 
leadership during the Falkland War remains among the chief reasons she went on to be a 
revered politician. 
Blair’s leadership in the lead-up to the Iraq War was markedly different and in 
fact helped lead to the unprecedented move of asking for Parliament’s permission. Unlike 
Thatcher, who was responding to an attack and therefore moved with urgency, Blair went 
for months with the decision to invade Iraq looming. James Strong writes that it was his 
reluctance to even bring up a debate on Iraq that ultimately led Parliament to want to 
exert real influence, rather than merely record its opinions, on the matter.11 Remarkably, 
Blair’s power to move against Iraq was constrained primarily by the difficulty he faced in 
winning over Labour rebels.  
Blair, however, was aware of his popularity at home, which he greatly leveraged 
to his advantage. Blair had dramatically turned around his party’s electoral fortunes under 
New Labour, first as party leader and then prime minister, and as the 2016 Iraq Inquiry 
notes, it put him in such a dominant political position that he could act unilaterally 
without paying much heed to his Cabinet nor the civil service. The Guardian called the 
report “an unprecedented, devastating indictment of how a prime minister was allowed to 
make decisions by discarding all pretence at cabinet government, subverting the 
 




intelligence agencies, and making exaggerated claims about threats to Britain's national 
security."12  
Indeed, the only thing that did constrain Blair was the insistence of MPs, 
particularly in the Labour Party, to have a say over the matter. Blair ultimately said that 
allowing parliamentarians to have a say was “the right thing to do.”13 But his domestic 
popularity extended to Parliament too. Strong writes that by forcing MPs to pick a side 
knowing they were unlikely to end his premiership on the basis of their opposition to 
Iraq, Blair won. This gamble was also made possible by the knowledge that there were 
Conservative MPs who would support him in the vote. Blair was audacious yet 
calculating; he was all in and willing to put it all on the line. His treatment of his Cabinet 
and disregard for intelligence had been “borderline reckless” but his presentation of 
intelligence was careful and assertive. Blair labelled the intelligence as “extensive, 
detailed, and authoritative,” a characterization the U.K. and the rest of the world would 
later discern to be gross hyperbole. 
Blair also invented the urgency and gravity of the moment: “doing nothing is not 
an option,” presenting the vote as essentially a matter of confidence in his Government.14 
This willingness to go to great lengths was in no small part fueled by the commitment he 
had made to President George W. Bush that the U.K. would wholeheartedly support the 
 
12 Nick Hopkins, “Chilcot Exposes How Blair Kept Ministers and Generals in the Dark,” The 
Guardian, July 6, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/06/chilcot-exposes-how-blair-
kept-ministers-and-generals-in-the-dark. 
13 James Strong, “Interpreting the Syria Vote: Parliament and British Foreign Policy,” International 
Affairs 91, no. 5 (2015): 1123–39, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12401. 




U.S.. “I’ll be with you, whatever” he promised Bush in a now infamous memo.15 Perhaps 
he saw an opportunity to grow the so-called special relationship with the U.S. which also 
meant going along with whatever decisions were being in Washington. Nevertheless, he 
took a big risk with the Iraq War and was willing to expend a significant amount of 
political capital. While he won the Commons vote even while suffering a stunning 
Labour rebellion, the failures of the war have come to define his legacy in the years 
since.16  
 Cameron could not have been more different from Blair in his leadership and 
decision-making. Cameron was “consensual in style and more cautious in substance,” 
calling intelligence on the use of chemical weapons in Syria “a judgement call” and 
decision against intervening “a choice, but it is a choice with consequences.”17 He wasn’t 
willing to project the total confidence in the intelligence or his American counterpart, 
President Barack Obama, like Blair had in 2003. Surely his approach was at least in part 
informed by Blair’s legacy. Moreover, it became clear as years went by that though MPs 
had been given a say on the Iraq War, Blair was squarely blamed for its catastrophic 
failure. Thus, merely giving Parliament a say would not absolve Cameron, or any 
subsequent PM for that matter, of their responsibility to wage war carefully. Strong 
writes, “He [Cameron] preferred sobriety and accuracy, a sensible strategy given how 
badly Blair’s hyperbole burnt him later… Unlike Blair, Cameron did not present his 
 
15 Robert Booth, “'With You, Whatever': Tony Blair's Letters to George W Bush,” The Guardian, 
July 6, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/06/with-you-whatever-tony-blair-letters-
george-w-bush-chilcot. 
16 Matthew Tempest, “Labour MPs Revolt over Iraq,” The Guardian, February 26, 2003, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/feb/26/foreignpolicy.uk2. 




policy as a matter of confidence in his government. He did not force Parliament to choose 
between Bashar al-Assad and himself.”18 
 Cameron was successful in convincing Parliament in 2011 to intervene in Libya 
amid the Arab Spring. He argued, “This is not another Iraq,” and invoked the 
responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine in order to protect civilians.19 Reflecting on the 
events of that summer, he wrote “To do nothing in these circumstances was not a neutral 
act. It was to facilitate murder.”20 He felt strongly about the need to intervene in the 
humanitarian crisis, but still chose to go to Parliament for approval. Blair had set the 
precedent in motion, but Cameron help crystalize it.  
 Politically, Cameron was in the exact opposite position to Blair when he went to 
Parliament in 2003. Cameron’s Conservative Party had suffered a devastating blow in the 
general election just months earlier, failing to secure a majority following a thirteen-year 
Labour government and ending up in coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, 
which he called “an anti-war party.” By going to Parliament, and making not just a moral 
and emotional plea but also ruling out the use of ground forces, he was able to secure a 
resounding victory in support of the intervention: the motion was carried 557-13.21 
Ultimately, though, Cameron wouldn’t have it as easy as the Libya vote in later 
years. In 2013, Cameron had his hands tied by Parliament when he asked MPs’ approval 
 
18 Strong, “Why Parliament Now Decides,” 616. 
19 United Kingdom, Hansard HC Deb (21 March 2011), vol. 525, col. 709. 
20 David Cameron, “David Cameron Book: To Do Nothing in Libya Was to Facilitate Murder,” 
September 14, 2019, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/david-cameron-book-to-do-nothing-in-libya-was-
to-facilitate-murder-53x8fl0hb.  





to act in response to the use of chemical weapons in Damascus. Strong notes that the 
Syria vote was closer to that of Iraq, rather than Libya, writing, “Yet he erred more 
fundamentally by letting Syria look like a re-run of the perceived disaster in Iraq. He was 
perhaps duped by the relative ease with which the Libya motion passed.”22 Whether it 
was the MPs stubbornness in not accepting the shaky intelligence or Cameron’s failure to 
make a strong enough case for intervention, he came up short, with Parliament severely 
undermining his authority in an unprecedented defeat of 272 to 285.23 For his part, he 
was quick to accept Parliament’s wishes and vowed to not get involved in the conflict.  
In April 2018, Prime Minister Theresa May joined the U.S. and France in a 
trilateral air strike against Syria for its use of chemical weapons yet again, again in 
Damascus. May circumvented Parliament, despite bipartisan calls from MPs for an a 
priori approval of the intervention. As McCormack observes the decision may well have  
been a politically calculated one, informed by the legacies of her predecessors:  
“May has learnt an important lesson from Cameron’s requests for 
democratic authorisation from the electorate whether on bombing 
Syria or leaving the European Union; when you ask for democratic 
authorisation for a political policy the answer may not be the one that 
you want. If the convention can simply be ignored, if the government of 
the day worries the answer will be ‘wrong’, then it does not exist.”24 
Both Blair in 2003 and Cameron in 2013 went into the votes believing they had the 
necessary support to win the motions. But Blair, unlike Cameron, was prepared to act, 
come what may. Perhaps May’s decision was informed by the realization that almost two 
 
22 Strong, “Interpreting the Syria Vote,” 1226. 
23 Nicholas Watt, et al, “Blow to Cameron's Authority as MPs Rule out British Assault on Syria,” 
The Guardian, August 30, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/aug/30/cameron-mps-syria. 
24 Tara McCormack, Britain’s War Powers: The Fall and Rise of Executive Authority? (Basel: 




years into her premiership defined by Brexit negotiations, a deflating general election 
loss in 2017 and subsequent coalition government, she desperately needed to show 




CABINET AND THE CIVIL SERVICE 
 Cabinet and the civil service play a critical but often unseen role in guiding the 
Prime Minister and the government in foreign affairs and national security, making them 
a key component in the study of British war powers. However, their ability to give advice 
and make important decisions is highly dependent on the style of the sitting Prime 
Minister and indeed how much he or she is willing to engage them.  
For the first time since Thatcher, the premiership of Tony Blair reignited the 
debate over whether the British executive was becoming more presidential. Peter 
Hennessy helps contextualize Prime Ministers over time, calling Clement Attlee and 
Margaret Thatcher “weathermakers,” Edward Heath and Tony Blair “system-shifters,” 
and Winston Churchill and James Callaghan “seasoned copers.” Although Cameron and 
May never fully got attached to the “presidential” label in the same way as Blair – current 
Prime Minister Boris Johnson may well do – they too carried on the effects of a 
presidential premiership in many ways.25  
 Thatcher, who relished her nickname “The Iron Lady,” was often out of step with 
her own Cabinet, prompting several Cabinet resignations. “I object to a system that 
deliberately pits Downing Street against individual Departments, breeds resentment 
amongst Ministers and Civil Servants and turns the Prime Minister into a President,” 
Francis Pym, the Foreign Secretary during the Falklands War remarked.26 Indeed, those 
 
25 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders Since 1945, (London: Penguin, 
2002), 527-535. 





at the highest levels in her Cabinet, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel 
Lawson and the Secretary of State for Defense Michael Heseltine, resigned in protest 
over the way Cabinet was being run, particularly due to their inability to make their case 
to Cabinet.  
 During the Falklands crisis though, Thatcher, known for her remarkable self-will, 
not only deferred strategic decisions to military leaders but then supported them 
unfailingly. Victor Bailey noted: “[Thatcher] did what [Winston] Churchill had a bad 
habit of not doing, which was she gave overall command to her military leaders and did 
not interfere with their strategic decisions.”27 Then-Chancellor Sir Geoffrey Howe 
remarked that the war was “like being on sabbatical,” since Thatcher decided to fund the 
operation as much as it demanded.28 Thatcher and the cabinet made decisions 
independent of Parliament. When she did go to Parliament with news of an impending 
war, it was merely to get the Cabinet’s decision rubberstamped, rather than obtain 
permission to go ahead.  
Journalists, scholars, ministers and aides all agree in varying degrees that Blair 
was perhaps the most presidential Prime Minister in the history of the country. Indeed, 
there was a sense within No. 10 that Cabinet as it functioned traditionally did not work 
effectively. Blair preferred a more person-to-person approach to a roundtable meeting 
that was expected in Cabinet. His own ministers decried the approach, saying the “the 
centralising tendency and arrogance of No. 10” and “lack of inclusiveness of the cabinet, 
 
27 Kennedy, “Margaret Thatcher's Reputation.” 





MPs, party members and the unions leads to bad decisions.”29 Clare Short who resigned 
from Cabinet over the Iraq War, echoed the sentiment: “his [Blair’s] personal entourage 
of advisers…enhances the personal power of the Prime Minister and reduces the quality 
of decision-making.” 
Ministers and aides characterize Blair’s leadership style as one in which only he 
sees the big picture, making decisions in silos rather than as a collective. Blair held 783 
ad-hoc person-to-person meetings with ministers in his first three years in office, rather 
than bringing up matters during full Cabinet meetings.30 In fact, Rhodes notes that Blair 
rarely chaired cabinet meetings, and that the shortened full Cabinet meetings were merely 
exercises to approve decisions already made in private. This rubber-stamping process in 
Cabinet became known as Blair’s “sofa government.”  
Under Blair, both No. 10 and the Cabinet Office also underwent major structural 
rearrangements, ultimately giving way to the centralization of power and the increase of 
special advisors. The Policy Unit was folded into the Prime Minister’s Private Office, the 
number of special advisers more than tripled from John Major to Blair, and the number of 
No. 10 staff doubled.31  
Rod Rhodes also notes that the “civil service monopoly of information and advice 
was broken under Thatcher” but that Blair exacerbated it. The traditional flow of 
information from Whitehall to the relevant committees to the Cabinet was replaced by the 
influx of special advisors and a proclivity to make decisions within a tight group of 
 
29 Rhodes, “The Court Politics,” 5. 
30 Ibid, 7. 




people close to Blair. In essence, some 3,000-plus senior civil servants were overtaken by 
a few dozen senior advisers and even then, policy advisers felt that their expertise was 
being short-changed in favor of the views of a few in the Prime Minister’s inner-circle, 
however unfamiliar with the policy they were. This was only compounded by competing 
centers of information between Blair and Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown – 
a phenomenon described as a “dual monarchy.” Nevertheless, as Hennessy summarized 
it, “Number 10 is omnipresent.”32 
This shift reflected Blair’s view of the British civil service, which he would later 
call “superb” yet “unresponsive.” Since leaving office, he has criticized the civil service, 
observing, “I learned it’s great at managing things, but not great at changing things.”33 He 
also noted that he felt it was necessary to bring in special advisors to make reform 
possible and that “reinventing government” was and ought to be a priority for any 
Government. 
Blair’s relationship with his Cabinet was perhaps never more scrutinized than 
over his decision-making process in the run-up to the Iraq War. Subsequent inquiries all 
depicted Blair as determined to go to war with the U.S., no matter the cost, politically or  
otherwise. Robin Butler’s 2005 report concludes,  
“However, we are concerned that the informality and circumscribed 
character of the Government's procedures which we saw in the context 
of policy-making towards Iraq risks reducing the scope for informed 
collective political judgement. Such risks are particularly 
 
32 Ibid. 
33 Jane Dudman, “Tony Blair: UK Civil Service Has Genuine Problem with Change,” The 





significant…where hard facts are inherently difficult to come by and 
the quality of judgement is accordingly all the more important.”34 
The Iraq Inquiry, a seven-year long investigation chaired by John Chilcot published in 
2016, perhaps delivered the most damning indictment of Blair’s handling of the war, 
outlining the flawed decision-making that led to the U.S. and U.K.’s involvement in the 
war, and concluding that in fact not all diplomatic options had been exhausted before 
military deployment. Specifically on Blair’s engagement with his Cabinet over the war, 
the report notes, “This is one of a number of occasions identified by the Inquiry when 
policy should have been considered by a Cabinet Committee and then discussed by 
Cabinet itself.” Moreover, it observed that “Most decisions on Iraq pre‑conflict were 
taken either bilaterally between Mr Blair and the relevant Secretary of State or in 
meetings between Mr Blair, Mr Straw and Mr Hoon, with No.10 officials and, as 
appropriate, Mr John Scarlett (Chairman of the JIC), Sir Richard Dearlove and Adm 
Boyce. Some of those meetings were minuted; some were not.”35 This bilateral approach 
to decision-making in the run-up to the war resembles accounts of Blair’s approach 
during his tenure more broadly, preferring efficiency to decisions are arrived at through 
rigorous debate by the entire Cabinet, including those who are not directly involved in the 
matter.  
 
34 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Review of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction, 
(London: The Stationery Office, 2004), 162, https://fas.org/irp/world/uk/butler071404.pdf 
35 United Kingdom, House of Commons, The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary, 






Chilcot’s report also suggests that including the Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
the Deputy Prime Minister, or ministers like Robin Cook who vocalized their concerns to 
Blair’s policy, would have encouraged debate. The report also points out several 
instances in the run-up to the Commons vote when advice agreed upon by senior officials 
in certain departments was not discussed collectively at Cabinet. Robin Cook, who 
resigned from government in protest of the war, recalled that “[Blair] avoided having 
discussions in Cabinet until decisions had already been taken and he treated the 
discussion in ‘this supreme body of collective government’ like a ‘Q & A session’ at a 
party branch. He was ‘unfazed’ that the summary of the contributions pointed in the 
opposite direction to his policy stance.”36  
Blair and his allies, in subsequent years, have given repeated defenses of his style 
of dealing with Cabinet, saying that the nature of the meeting meant that decisions 
couldn’t be made properly. Jonathan Powell, Blair’s Chief of Staff, said, “…Cabinet is 
the right place to ratify decisions, the right place for people to raise concerns if they have 
not done so before, the right place for briefings by the Prime Minister and other Ministers 
on strategic issues, the right place to ensure political unity; but it is categorically not the 
right place for an informed decision on difficult and detailed policy issues.”37 That is a far 
cry from then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Jack Straw, 
who said in 2009, “Dialogue [in Cabinet] must be fearless. Ministers must have the 
confidence to challenge each other in private. They must ensure that decisions have been 
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properly thought through, sounding out all possibilities before committing themselves to 
a course of action.”38  
Blair himself has defended his actions in Cabinet fiercely, insisting that Cabinet 
had “substantive discussion” on the available options in the run-up to the war. He told the 
House of Commons Liaison Committee in 2013 that not only were there plenty of 
opportunities for debate since September 2002 in “virtually every Cabinet meeting” but 
also that 28 separate meetings were held during the war with relevant Cabinet 
Committees.39 Yet both Butler and Chilcot’s reports outline the repeated instances when 
key intelligence and advice as well as specific strategy were not discussed at Cabinet 
meetings. Perhaps most crucially, at the Cabinet meeting on March 17, 2003 – the day 
before the Commons was set to vote on the war – Attorney General Goldsmith was not 
questioned about the change in his legal advice on the legality of going to war in the 
absence of a second UN resolution. “Cabinet was, however, being asked to confirm the 
decision that the diplomatic process was at an end and that the House of Commons 
should be asked to endorse the use of military action to enforce Iraq’s compliance. Given 
the gravity of this decision, Cabinet should have been made aware of the legal 
uncertainties,” Chilcot writes.40 Yet again, in a moment of grave importance, the Cabinet 
was not fully briefed and provided with all the necessary advice to make a final decision 
on a matter of, quite literally, life or death.  
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When David Cameron came to power in May 2010, among his chief foreign 
policy goals was to reform the decision-making process. To do so, he created the 
National Security Council (NSC) on his first day in office, convening foreign and 
security policy experts in one place. No. 10 said at the time, “The Council will coordinate 
responses to the dangers we face, integrating at the highest level the work of the foreign, 
defence, home, energy and international development departments, and all other arms of 
government contributing to national security.”41 The NSC at its outset consisted of top 
government figures including the Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary 
and the International Development Secretary. However, other officials with portfolios 
relating to national security, including intelligence officials from MI5, MI6 and 
elsewhere, were invited. Unlike Blair who had obsessed over leaks and preferred to limit 
decision-making to a close-knit group, Cameron welcomed this cross-collaboration 
among not just Whitehall but the entire Government. 
Nevertheless, the creation of the NSC marked a significant departure from the 
sofa government politics of the Blair era. As a former senior intelligence officer put it, “it 
was very difficult under the previous arrangements to necessarily detect what decisions, 
if any decisions, were being taken on a number of issues, and the thinking that led to 
those decisions was even more opaque.”42 Though Thatcher and Blair were the most 
willing to shake up the system to their will, prime ministers for over a century had 
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contemplated on how best to manage national security. Each prioritized the Cabinet, 
special advisers, the civil service, and intelligence agencies differently. With the creation 
of the NSC, Cameron institutionally changed policymaking on national security “in terms 
of regularity of process, frequency of high-level ministerial and official attendance at 
meetings, and focused secretariat support” and thus “brought greater clarity to a broad 
range of national security policy issues.”43 Instead of several different Cabinet 
Committees dealing with national security issues in silos, there was a collective and 
collaborative effort to deal with ongoing threats.  
The NSC played a big role in Britain’s intervention in Libya in 2011: The 
National Security Council (Libya) (NSC(L)) as it was called met 58 times during the 
intervention. Though Cameron was largely seen to be a “passionate interventionist,” the 
was determined to avoid the foreign policy blunders of the past.44 Cameron’s Cabinet 
didn’t just function to rubberstamp decisions that had already been made. Lively debate 
reportedly took place between the cautious Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, and the 
hawkish Education Secretary Michael Gove. Kenneth Clarke, the veteran minister in 
charge of the Justice Department who had bucked the Tory whip to vote against the Iraq 
War, warned of a partition coming in Libya, while Liam Fox, the Defense Secretary, 
expressed hesitation over “another open-ended commitment.” Moreover, Cameron 
instructed his team to prepare to stabilize the region – yet another sign he was determined 
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to not make the mistake Blair had made of waging a war with no end or victory. They 
identified five areas: “a credible political plan; a quick restart of the economy; the 
prioritisation of security and justice to protect, for example, women's rights; basic 
services, such as water; and strategic communications so that people know what is 
happening in the country.”45  
Despite Cameron’s pragmatism and initial success, he and his Government would 
be heavily criticized in years to come by both President Barack Obama as well as 
parliamentary inquiries for giving up on Libya too soon. Obama was critical of his allies 
in Britain and France for losing interest in rebuilding Libya after the overthrow of 
Muammar Gaddafi, thus making the broader intervention unsuccessful.46 A parliamentary 
report on Libya concluded that Cameron and his Government had not prepared for the 
event of a regime change, and suggested that military and intelligence ought to be given a 
formal right to dissent at NSC meetings which would then require government officials to 
act accordingly.47  
Despite the revival of collective decision-making that the creation of the NSC 
brought, and the cautiously optimistic style of governing under Cameron, the British 
Government’s judgement of intelligence and commitment to the cause still came under 
attack. “Through his decision-making in the national security council, former prime 
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minister David Cameron was ultimately responsible for the failure to develop a coherent 
Libya strategy,” the report read.48
 





 Through the premierships of Blair and Cameron, a parliamentary prerogative had 
formed, preventing British Prime Ministers from going to war without the consent of 
Parliament. While Blair had set the precedent with Iraq in 2003, Cameron’s continued 
subsequent application of it helped crystalize the convention.  
 If the Iraq vote succeeded in allowing Parliament to have a say in when Britain 
goes to war, the 2013 Syria vote succeeded in wholly stopping the Prime Minister from 
acting through any means. When then-Leader of the Opposition Ed Miliband asked 
Cameron immediately following the vote, “there having been no motion passed by this 
House tonight, can the prime minister confirm to the House that he will not use the royal 
prerogative to order the UK to be part of military action,” Cameron replied, “I can give 
that assurance.”49 He once again sought Parliament’s permission to conduct airstrikes in 
Syria in 2015, which it approved by a thumping majority of 174.50 
Strong, arguing the formation of this new parliamentary prerogative wrote in 
2014, “A future parliament, differently comprised, may yet decide to give this power up 
(Bogdanor 2009, 224). But absent a parliamentary change of heart, no future British 
military deployment will achieve domestic legitimacy without MPs’ express support.”51 
Indeed, in April 2018, a different Parliament with a different Prime Minister, Theresa 
May, did not play a role in the authorization of the trilateral strikes the U.K., the U.S., 
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and France took against Syria following a chemical weapon attack in Douma, a suburb of 
Damascus.  
This begs the question: how did two Prime Ministers of the same party interpret 
this convention in completely different ways in the span of less than three years. Tara 
McCormack writes, “May did not repudiate the convention, rather, May argued that the 
military action did not meet the criteria for the Parliamentary convention.”52 May’s 
decision complicates the saga of the battle for war powers, both underscoring 
Parliament’s case for scrutiny and accountability as well as the executive’s case for 
certain privileges that would make a formal giving away of war powers to MPs highly 
unlikely.  
 The 2018 strikes also show the limits of Parliament and the MPs that sit in the 
Commons. Prior to the Iraq vote, lacking the formal powers to authorize or block military 
actions, MPs resorted to using adjournment debates to air their support or grievances, 
with the knowledge that they will not have any tangible effect on government policy. 
Strong notes that between the Korean War in 1950 to the Iraq War in 2003, Parliament 
never once voted directly on a military action. Indeed, even Blair used adjournment 
debates to announce military actions in Iraq, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan 
during his first three years in office.53  
 Parliament also lacks power in other fundamental ways: “The government retains 
the power to decide the timing and format of any debate and vote. Parliament cannot 
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recall itself should hostilities arise other than during its regular sessions. MPs rarely dare 
to defy the party whip.”54 Even the precedent that was developed through Blair and 
Cameron was done so at the mercy of those very men, and May’s decision to not go to 
Parliament in 2018 proved just that.  
It is worth noting, however, that on the matter of defying the party whip, votes 
from Iraq in 2003 to Syria in 2015 suggest an unusual willingness by MPs to vote their 
conscience, with MPs of both parties rebelling against their leaders. Blair suffered his 
biggest Parliamentary rebellion over Iraq, with 122 of 199 MPs who voted against the 
war coming from his own party.55 Cameron likewise suffered a humiliating blow in 2013 
over Syria as 30 Conservative MPs joined the opposition to vote against the strikes.56 
Strong writes though, “Every government will likely face rebellions over the use of force. 
Those with larger majorities can absorb larger rebellions.”57 Blair, who had a 167-seat 
majority was able to absorb the triple-digit rebellion, while Cameron who was in 
coalition government with the Liberal Democrats was not able to survive even a few 
dozen rebellions. May, who was also in a coalition government with the Democratic 
Unionist Party, opted to bypass Parliament altogether, knowing that she would likely not 
survive a rebellion if the deployment was put to a vote. 
Nevertheless, in April 2018, Parliament was on recess when the attack was 
ordered, and was not recalled, despite bipartisan calls for a parliamentary vote. Even MPs 
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who supported the action expressed their frustration about not being consulted, “It was 
right that the UK joined our allies in action to degrade Assad’s chemical weapon 
capability in Syria…the prime minister must explain to parliament why she believed it 
was not appropriate to put this to [a] vote in advance,” Labour MP John Woodcock 
said.58 During a two-day debate following the strikes, Corbyn lamented, “It seems the 
convention established in 2003, and in the cabinet manual, is being tossed aside as simply 
being inconvenient” and added, “It’s for this house to take matters into its own hands and 
back our control…,” invoking the Chilcot Inquiry as a reminder for the need to scrutinize 
and approve the Government’s actions beforehand.59  
May’s defense of her actions during the debate revealed not only how weak the 
parliamentary prerogative was but also how unlikely a “War Powers Act” that formally 
granted Parliament authorizing powers would be. May said that while she believed 
Parliament ought to be able to debate military actions, it “does not mean it is always 
appropriate. It therefore cannot and should be not be codified into a parliamentary right to 
debate every possible overseas mission in advance.”60 She cited a written ministerial 
statement from 2016 when then-Defense Secretary Sir Michael Fallon set out an 
exception to the parliamentary prerogative: “For as the exception makes clear, there are 
also situations where coming to parliament in advance would undermine the security of 
our operations or constrain the ability of our armed forces to act quickly and decisively. 
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In these situations it is right for the prime minister to take the decision and then to be held 
accountable to parliament for it.”61 
Arguing why her actions had precedent and were warranted, she laid out four 
points: (1) notifying Parliament could compromise the safety of British servicemembers 
carrying out the mission by alerting the enemy; (2) given the top-secret nature of the 
intelligence gathered by British agencies and its allies, the Government could not share 
the intelligence it bases its decision-making on with Parliament in a public manner; (3) it 
was important to act with key British allies like the U.S. and France and protect their 
troops by doing so secretly; and (4) there was legal precedent set out by Parliament in a 
bipartisan manner for governments to authorize such strikes as a last resort on 
humanitarian grounds (for example, in Kosovo in 1999).62 
  Closing her remarks in the debate, May delivered a forceful rebuke of a war  
powers act that was being proposed by the Opposition: 
“Let me be absolutely clear what such a war powers Act would mean. 
It would mean that many smaller scale, timely and targeted 
interventions—like the action we have taken to alleviate further 
humanitarian suffering by degrading Syria’s chemical weapons 
capability and deterring their use—became unviable.  
“Put simply, making it unlawful for Her Majesty’s Government to 
undertake any such military intervention without a vote would seriously 
compromise our national security, our national interests and the lives 
of British citizens at home and abroad—and for as long as I am Prime 
Minister, that will never be allowed to happen.”63 
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May acknowledged the lack of trust among Parliament and the public in government 
evidence regarding military actions in the post-Iraq era. Even so, she reasoned, the 
Government had “an obligation to protect the safety and security of our sources.”64 In the 
end, Conservative MPs backed May in a symbolic motion on whether Parliament had 
been given an opportunity to debate the Government’s military actions in Syria in a vote 
of 317-256.65  
 The debate between May and Corbyn, along with their allies, was the latest 
iteration of a long-running debate in British politics on whether Parliament should decide 
on military actions. Governments since Blair’s have vowed to make the executive more 
accountable. A 2007 Green Paper titled The Governance of Britain proposed a number of 
reforms “to forge a new relationship between government and citizen, and begin the 
journey towards a new constitutional settlement—a settlement that entrusts Parliament 
and the people with more power.”66 It hoped to restore public trust in government, which 
had been greatly undermined in part by the unpopular decision to go to war in Iraq. 
Among the proposals were “limiting the powers of the executive” by surrendering or 
limiting powers that had been solely under the discretion of the executive. Such powers 
included deploying troops abroad, recalling and dissolving Parliament, and ratifying 
international treaties. The Green Paper also proposed several measures that would make 
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the executive more accountable, including increasing transparency around national 
security strategy.  
 In 2011, then-Foreign Secretary William Hague committed the Government to 
legislating Parliament’s role in authorizing military action. The 2011 Cabinet Manual 
emphasized this convention, noting that except in an emergency situation that made the 
convention untenable, the Government would observe it.67 Indeed it did, enduring wins 
and losses alike. Citing these developments in 2018, Corbyn argued, “…so what we are 
doing is actually going back on an established position…Yet Government policy now 
seems to have shifted against this process.”68  
 Many who joined Corbyn in protesting May’s decision to circumvent Parliament 
primarily did so primarily on the basis of accountability and legitimacy rather than the 
necessity for such a strike. Corbyn invoked public opinion polling which showed a lack 
of support from the British public for strikes in Syria in the days leading up to the 
trilateral mission.69 70 Leader of the Scottish Nationalist Party Ian Blackford urged 
colleagues to remember 2013 when Cameron recalled Parliament to vote on an attack in 
response to Syria’s use of chemical weapons in Douma and 2015 when Parliament 
debated on voted on an airstrikes campaign against Da’esh, commonly known as ISIS. In 
both cases, Parliament’s votes mirrored the British public’s sentiments, further 
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underscoring MPs’ claims that Parliament alone can provide the legitimacy needed for 
government actions by speaking and voting on behalf of the British people.71 72 
But as Strong argues, conventions within the British legal system “remain 
contestable, however widely accepted they become,” and despite written documents, ex-
Prime Ministers, and public opinion all vouching for and supporting its existence, 
governments of the day may still reinterpret it or choose to ignore it entirely, as many 
have argued May did.73 Strong also warns of the issues of a “War Powers Act,” which 
many, like Corbyn, have pushed for. “Parliament is powerful because the government 
depends on its support in order to survive. Its power is negative because it is purely 
reactive and destructive,” Strong writes.74 However, it is also true that should 
Parliament’s powers relating to military action be enshrined, governments would not only 
enjoy the legitimacy in the court of public opinion that Parliament’s approval confers, but 
also be able to lay some of the blame of an unsuccessful intervention with the MPs that 
voted in favor of it.   
Even so, such legislation may be undone by future Parliaments, which are not 
bound by the legislation of their predecessors or a future government that is 
unsympathetic to the law. Moreover, Strong argues that it is the pressure from MPs that 
forced Blair and Cameron to grant Parliament a vote on military action, and that 
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codifying these powers could mean letting the courts, not MPs, decide when the 
government is obliged to consult Parliament. This scenario would in fact limit their 
power in this sphere, even if it enumerated their powers clearly.  
Beyond this, MPs do not possess the authority to deploy the military or roll back 
deployments once they have commenced. Instead, they must decide on the authorization 
of a deployment based on the limited information they have. It is conceivable then that 
regardless of a “War Powers Act,” the government of the day could claim it must move 
forward with a deployment based on the top-secret intelligence that it has which cannot 
be made available to Parliament. This, however, would diminish the government’s 
authority and legitimacy in its action.  
 Finally, the backlash to May’s decision to bypass Parliament demonstrates that 
the war powers convention has become so entrenched in Parliament that the scale of the 
conflict no longer has a bearing on whether or not MPs want a say beforehand as scholars 
had previously thought.75 Indeed, whether it is long-term conflicts like Iraq and Libya 
that require heavy military presences and seek regime change, or limited, targeted strikes 
that seek to punish a humanitarian offence and degrade weapons capability as were the 
cases with Syria in 2013 and 2018, MPs want the power to authorize military 
deployments of any kind.  
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 The battle for British war powers remains unsettled. Yet the events of the last 
twenty years, and more specifically the last decade, suggest that a formalization of the 
parliamentary prerogative is unlikely. Despite repeated calls from MPs and unfulfilled 
promises from subsequent governments to enshrine Parliament’s role in Britain’s military 
affairs, the likelihood of a “War Powers Act” remains slim.  
 Following the 2003 Iraq vote, Robin Cook, who resigned as Foreign Secretary 
over the war, famously said, “I may not have succeeded in halting the war, but I did 
secure the right of parliament to decide on war.”76 Indeed, Parliament has since played a 
decisive role in matters of war and peace, even going so far as to veto David Cameron’s 
plan to partake in airstrikes in Syria in 2013 – a move that seemed to temporarily alienate 
him from his closest ally, the United States, and embarrass him on the international stage.  
 Despite that, Parliament remains at the mercy of the executive when it comes to 
military deployments for a number of reasons. It lacks the ability to dictate debates and 
votes, or even when it sits in the House of Commons for that matter. It is far more 
reactive than it is proactive, and that is unlikely to change barring significant reform that 
requires considerable political will from the executive.  
 Moreover, the Prime Minister retains great flexibility and choice as a matter of the 
position itself and his or her leadership style. During the Falklands War, Thatcher was 
decisive even in the midst of opposition and kept her Cabinet unified by bestowing a 
great deal of trust in them. Blair on the other hand utilized Cabinet as a forum to 
 




rubberstamp decisions he had already made in smaller meetings, a style that prompted 
high-profile resignations and damning inquiries that have defined his legacy. 
Nevertheless, he enjoyed a lofty governing majority and broad support for his domestic 
agenda, both of which allowed him to win the vote, however controversial. Cameron 
proved to be much more cautious, and evidently had learned from Blair’s downfall 
following the Iraq War. He made decision-making around military affairs much more 
collaborative, with the creation of the National Security Council. His decision to give 
MPs more of a say granted him praise and legitimacy, but also defeat and humiliation. 
Beyond values, it was also likely a product of his uneasy coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats. 
 Most tellingly, perhaps, May bypassed Parliament despite the criticism. She 
argued that the security of the nation and British servicemembers as well as the secrecy 
of the intelligence made it impossible for her to grant MPs an a priori vote. Those needs 
are compelling, as MPs attest to themselves.77 However, her decision may have very well 
also been informed by the fact that given her weak governing majority made possible 
through an unholy coalition with the Democratic Unionist Party, she would not have been 
able to absorb a rebellion like Blair had and may have been handcuffed in the same way 
Cameron had been in 2013.  
  The needs for the executive to be flexible in its ability to make military decisions 
and reliable in its ability to join key allies in conflict, as articulated by May in her speech 
following the 2018 strikes, are important. The uncertainty caused by the parliamentary 
 




prerogative in its current form does a great disservice to both of those needs. But that 
doesn’t simply mean that Prime Ministers in the future can revert back to a time before 
2003, when Parliament played a small role in military affairs. Parliament has public 
opinion on its side in matters of military deployment, as it did nearly every single time in 
the votes between 2003 and 2018.  Prime Ministers, for the many powers, vast 
intelligence, and numerous agencies at their disposal, derive their legitimacy from 
Parliament. May’s actions in 2018 are significant in that they prove the parliamentary 
prerogative is subject to reinterpretation and can therefore falter, but they are not a 
prescription to future Prime Ministers to disregard the wishes of Parliament in foreign 
affairs.  
 Thus, it is the case that Parliament has many disadvantages to overcome in order 
to have a meaningful say on when Britain goes to war. It is true that Prime Ministers have 
political incentives and diplomatic realities to consider when deciding whether or not to 
go to Parliament, since it is still yet not a legal requirement to do so. The Prime 
Minister’s tone and conviction, as well as Cabinet and Whitehall’s expertise, continue to 
play a major role in deciding when Britain goes to war. So, as it stands, MPs will have to 
rely on coercion and criticism -- both directly and indirectly, both within the House of 
Commons and in public – to pressure Prime Ministers into giving them a say on military 
deployments beforehand. Nearly two decades since Blair’s remarkable decision to go to 
Parliament, it would take yet another extraordinary step by a Prime Minister to cede a 
considerable amount of his or her own power and make way for a “War Powers Act.” At 




gamble, one that could threaten future governments’ stability domestically and standing 
internationally. Until then, though, the political tug-of-war continues between the Prime 
Minister and Parliament, without a clear sense of who decides on one of the most critical 
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